Cherokees in the Age of Revolutions

Kate Fullagar

The Age of Revolutions played out in Indigenous country just as surely as it unfurled in European lands and waters. For Indigenous people, however, the central political contest was not between democracy and autocracy, or republicanism and monarchy, but between their rights to sovereignty and imperial efforts to exploit, remove, or replace them. This essay explores the example of the Cherokees in southeast North America during the second half of the eighteenth century. In this period, the Cherokees went from managing multiple dynamic foreign empires to confronting the determined imperatives of one subset of one empire. At first, they had to juggle competing claims on their time, goods, and bodies from a range of French and British colonists, all while trying to preserve essential elements of their culture and economy. As the French gradually ceded imperial space to the British, who in turn faced revolutionary challenges from within, the Cherokees learned that their biggest problem had become how to maintain their very sense of self-definition.

That the latter revolutionary challengers also spoke a language of liberty and consent while plundering Native hunting grounds and towns did nothing to endear the Cherokees to Western notions of equality or popular governance. Worse, it meant that later chroniclers of the American Revolutionary Age were too often distracted by rebellious rhetoric to see how much Indigenous people had paid the price for settler independence. The Cherokees, like most Native American communities, have been overly neglected in histories of the era—not only because their story destabilizes attempts at a triumphalist or celebratory account but also because it makes some of those core debates look half-baked. This essay centers the Cherokee experience of this period in an effort to add back one key group of Native Americans to a well-known field and to reconsider revolutionary ideals in light of unrepentant imperial invasion. It sketches the wide range of ways that the Cherokees faced the conditions

of the age—from diplomatic accommodation to violent resistance to an outright refusal to engage. Three men serve here to represent these differing tactics: Attakullakulla (Tsalagi), a long-lived leader from the powerful town of Chota; Dragging Canoe (Tsiyu Gansini), his firebrand son who also identified with the town of Chota; and Ostenaco (Ustanaqua), the *skiagusta,* or Head Man, of Tomotley, near Chota.[1]

Attakullakulla

Attakullakulla was the oldest of the three men, born around 1710. He was originally of the Nipissing peoples located much farther north but had been adopted by Cherokees as a war prize when just an infant. His thorough integration into Cherokee society and unwavering loyalty to them throughout his life demonstrated something of how eighteenth-century Cherokees recognized kin: they belonged to their clans through their maternal lines, but belonging came about either from a mother's blood or from a mother's choice. Attakullakulla had been chosen by his adopted mother, and thus became fully Cherokee.[2]

Attakullakulla's abiding approach to foreign empires was negotiation. He pursued this approach through trade wars, hostage crises, war talks, and revolutionary settlement. This is not to suggest he was always a pushover. His wily ways often bested imperial foes. In those moments when they did not, the outcomes usually spoke more poorly of European attitudes toward diplomacy than they did of Attakullakulla's acumen.

His greatest success was probably his work through the early 1750s trade embargo imposed by British South Carolina on the Cherokees. In 1751, South Carolina governor James Glen ordered an embargo against all Cherokee towns as punishment for their rumored random attacks on British traders. While Glen waited in Charleston for the Cherokees to cave, occasionally entertaining representations from separate Cherokee towns, Attakullakulla traveled to Williamsburg to see if he could start a rival trade with British Virginia. By 1753, he was successful: the Virginian governor Robert Dinwiddie relented to Attakullakulla's argument that Cherokee deerskins, and possible future manpower in any upcoming battles, were worth more than good relations with South Carolina.[3] Glen, needless to say, was irate, suggesting to Attakullakulla that he did not understand how British power worked. Attakullakulla replied coolly that he had British friends other than Glen now to send him over to Britain to

verify this claim.[4] Glen had to admit a checkmate, and the Cherokees enjoyed uninterrupted trade, benefiting both them and European colonists, for several further years.

By 1758, however, relations had soured again. The rot had started, in fact, with Virginia, which had recruited hundreds of Cherokee warriors—Attakullakulla among them—to help them fight several battles against French colonists during the Seven Years' War. The Cherokee units served honourably, expecting respect and war prizes in return. When neither eventuated after a failed attack at Fort Duquesne, Attakullakulla was affronted. No less a Virginian leader than Colonel George Washington voiced his concern about offending such an important ally: the Cherokees are "justly fired with the highest resentment," he observed, even though they are "indispensably necessary [to] our interest."[5]

Resentment triggered a backlash, which in turn spurred murderous and rapacious colonial violence. A missionary visiting Cherokee country in 1759 heard Attakullakulla himself "talk bad [and] appear in general disaffected." (The missionary, for the record, thought Attakullakulla justified, for "there is too much truth in what he says.")[6] Tensions boiled over when the next South Carolina governor, William Lyttelton, issued another embargo against the Cherokees. Attakullakulla again went to work, arguing for months for a resumption of relations. But when he was joined by fifty-five other Cherokee delegates, Lyttelton did the unthinkable and locked the whole party (minus Attakullakulla) in his council rooms as hostages. News of this insult traveled quickly to Cherokee townsfolk, who immediately threatened war. At one point Attakullakulla was the only Cherokee left representing peace. He managed eventually to get thirty-three Cherokees freed, but twenty-two remained. Unfortunately, Attakullakulla could not persuade his people to let him keep trying diplomatic efforts. On February 16, 1760, a party of Cherokee warriors surrounded the fort holding the hostages and opened fire. The colonial commander inside apparently screamed to his soldiers to resist retaliation, "but before I could get one to hear or answer me, they laid them all lifeless."[7]

The massacre of twenty-two Cherokees underscored the acuity of Attakullakulla's approach in dealing with Europeans, though being right in this scenario no doubt felt like a hollow achievement. Later, his peacemaking instincts perhaps judged the colonists less well. In 1763, when Pontiac's War exploded in response to the stupefying claims of sovereignty made by Britain in the Paris Peace Treaty, Attakullakulla advised

neutrality. Several delegations from a wide range of Native American groups implored the Cherokees to join them in their pan-Indian fight against British usurpation. But Attakullakulla convinced his people that nonalignment was the safer option, given Britain's ever-increasing powers on the continent now that the French had bowed out.[8] Possibly the famed expertise of Cherokee warriors in a pan-Indian force would have helped Pontiac's War make a greater dent on imperial dreams that it did. Certainly it would have prolonged the rebellion beyond its gradual collapse in 1765.

Attakullakulla's implicit hope that neutrality in Pontiac's War would endear the Cherokees to the British was horribly misplaced. Into the late 1760s and early 1770s, British colonists, now freed from the check of French rivalry, pressed the Cherokees into tougher and tougher agreements. As Attakullakulla himself observed by 1770, few of these agreements focused any more on trade: "Now all our talks are about Lands." The talks invariably resulted in unfair exchanges, lands for goods. "The White People get lands that last forever," Attakullakulla saw, "but the goods given us are soon gone." Furthermore, the talks seemed to become more and more lopsided: "The white people . . . are deaf to us and will not hear."[9]

Nevertheless, the goods offered to the Cherokees proved ever more enticing as the group found themselves less and less able to disengage from a global economy of guns and exotic consumables. By 1773, Attakullakulla, ever doubtful about the benefits of violence in such situations, had signed treaties, along with other leaders, that gave away more than 10 percent of Cherokee ground.[10] In 1775, he found himself facing an even more galling proposal. Colonial judge and speculator Richard Henderson gathered five hundred Cherokee men to Sycamore Shoals to offer them up to £4,000 worth of goods in exchange for a giant swathe of their grounds (more than twice what had already been ceded). Confronted with near starvation due to their decreasing hunting area, Attakullakulla felt compelled to take the deal.[11]

The Henderson purchase triggered a split in Cherokee sentiment when revolutionary war eventually arrived in their homelands. Its magnitude had proved too awful to some of the younger Cherokees. When British loyalists came searching for Cherokee allies to help them fight off revolutionary insurgents, these younger bloods were more than happy to seize the weapons proffered. They wanted a chance to fight the "White People," and they did not care on which side of the white-on-white conflict any of

them stood.[12] Attakullakulla could only stand back in dismay and watch a newly formed faction of his people go off to fight a newly formed faction of the colonists he knew so well.

The results, as Attakullakulla always feared, were catastrophic. Revolutionary settlers bore down on the Cherokee rebels in a ratio of six to one. Within three months more than two thousand Cherokees were dead. It was a heavy-hearted Attakullakulla who helped draw up the terms of surrender. In May 1777, he signed the Treaty of Dewitt's Corner with the revolutionary states of South Carolina and Georgia, and in July 1777 he signed the Treaty of Long Island with equally new and liberty-spouting North Carolina and Virginia. Each document pledged assurances that the Cherokees would not contest the sovereignty of the latest empire in their world—the United States of America.[13]

Dragging Canoe

One of the rebels who disagreed with Attakullakulla during the Henderson affair was his own son Dragging Canoe. This younger warrior, aged in his thirties at the time, had supported his elders up until this moment. But during the three-day talks, his frustration could not be suppressed. He was said to be very "displeased," explaining that the "white people wanted too much of their Hunting Grounds," and besides, it was "bloody Ground [i.e., contested by other Native groups] dark, and difficult to settle."[14] He walked out of the proceedings.

Thirteen months later, Dragging Canoe was the first to receive the party of British loyalists who came seeking Cherokee assistance. By April 1776, revolutionary war was already raging in other parts of the continent. Whether or not Dragging Canoe understood all the nuanced differences between the loyalists and patriots is unclear. What he wanted to communicate now to John Stuart, heading the visiting British contingent, was that the Cherokee "were almost surrounded by the White People [and] that they had but a small spot of ground left for them to stand upon." Dragging Canoe added that "it seemed to be the Intention of the White People to destroy them."[15]

Stuart thought he could manipulate such feelings into helping Dragging Canoe attack some of the white people in Cherokee Country (revolutionaries) but not target others (loyalists). Specifically, Stuart encouraged Dragging Canoe in his ire yet tried to restrain him until Stuart's side could

assemble the right numbers to make a concerted strike on the southern states. In this risky calculation, Stuart failed miserably. One month later, a deputation of mixed Native American groups also arrived in Cherokee Country. They explained to Dragging Canoe that now was the time, while the British usurpers seemed to be fighting each other, to use European weapons to defend all Indian claims. Stuart listened horrified to this deputation's Shawnee leader expound on how "the red people who were once Masters of the whole Country hardly possessed ground enough to stand on," and how "it was plain" that the white people intended "to extirpate them." The Shawnee leader intoned that "it was better to die like men than to diminish away by inches; [and] that now is the time to begin; that there is no time to be lost."[16]

Dragging Canoe, still smarting from the Henderson debacle, was easily convinced. He recruited hundreds of young Cherokee warriors also to paint their faces black and join the motley Native crew. On July 1, 1776, their unit struck at the settlers freshly moved into Sycamore Shoals. For several weeks, the Native rebels held the upper hand, and in some justice to Stuart's horror, they attacked white people "without distinction of party."[17]

As noted, however, the revolutionary backlash was severe. With troops brought in from Virginia, Georgia, and both Carolinas, a force defeated the Native front by October. Attakullakulla was left to sign the two unforgiving peace treaties. What has been too-little noticed in this terrible moment, all the same, is a remarkable piece of intergenerational cooperation in the background. Dragging Canoe knew that one of the terms of the U.S. peace treaties would be for his elders to hand over the rebels who had attacked the revolutionary settlers. Attakullakulla knew that to do so would shatter the last vestiges of Cherokee identity as he understood it. To avoid this impossible situation, Dragging Canoe gathered up his beaten rebels and decamped from Cherokee lands forever. He founded a new subgroup one hundred miles west of their old mountain towns, along the flatlands of Chickamauga Creek. It meant that the remaining Cherokees would not be held responsible for the rebels' actions.[18]

Europeans called the new subgroup the Chickamaugas and treated them like a newly spawned tribe. Dragging Canoe's community, however, called themselves the Ani-Yunwiya—the Real People. The name was not intended as a rebuke to the elders who stayed behind. Instead, it was designed to give hope to all Cherokees: to show that while some

had to experience the limitations of assimilation, others could keep the basic contours of their original lifeways alive. Within two years, the Ani-Yunwiya had constructed eleven interlinked new towns, replete with the Cherokees' seven-clan system of governance, central council house, and rules for matrilineal succession. Their resistance to the United States continued unabated. Dragging Canoe led attacks on the ever-advancing front of American citizens for another fifteen years. He died of natural causes in 1792.[19]

It was only in 1794, after every last alliance with other like-minded Native American groups had been smashed, that the Ani-Yunwiya agreed to the Treaty of the Tellico Blockhouse, an act that effectively conceded defeat to so-called republican democracy. Notably, though, it was also in that year that the Cherokee Nation first formally emerged as a recognized legal polity. Its first three leaders were warriors who had served under Dragging Canoe.[20]

Ostenaco

The final exemplary Cherokee man of this era was Ostenaco, nearer in age to Attakullakulla than to Dragging Canoe. Rather more like the son, though, Ostenaco identified through his life primarily as a warrior. By the age of twenty-five he had earned the formal title of Mankiller in his home town of Tellico. After the embargo breakdown of the 1750s, and the consequent rise of the town of Chota, Ostenaco moved to be closer to the new power base. He became the *skiagusta* of the nearby village of Tomotley in 1752.

Ostenaco's life represents a third way that Cherokees approached the incursions of the revolutionary era. He was neither a canny diplomat with Europeans like Attakullakulla, nor was he a violent resister to Europeans like Dragging Canoe. Instead, Ostenaco deployed both approaches at different times, as well as something else besides: by the end of his life he favoured a method that eschewed acknowledging Europeans altogether. He exercised what Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson has theorized as a politics of refusal.[21]

Ostenaco spent most of the 1750s accepting various commissions from colonial Virginia to help them fight off French threats. He always did so for rewards that would benefit the Cherokees as a whole. He fought in the Battle of Sandy Creek in 1756, for example, in return for a fort to protect

Cherokee women and children back home. In 1757, he helped "sort out a mess" in the Ohio Valley in exchange for guns and goods.[22] Virginian governor Robert Dinwiddie noted that Ostenaco had "the Character of a brave officer," while Colonel Washington admitted that his own units could not match Ostenaco's "Indian methods."[23]

As a periodically contracted ally of the British through this decade, then, Ostenaco was much like Attakullakulla. But during the hostage crisis of 1760 the peers parted ways. When Governor Lyttelton caused the death of the twenty-two Cherokee hostages, Ostenaco could not be calmed. "If peace was made even 7 times," he was heard to proclaim, he "would always disregard and break it."[24] Contrary to Attakullakualla's diplomatic approach in this critical moment, Ostenaco now backed the idea of violence. One month after the massacre, as British soldiers from every colony poured into Cherokee country to fight the revenge attacks, Ostenaco helped to lock up a whole garrison of a South Carolina fort. The garrison could do nothing for the next six months except slowly make their way through their rations. By August 1760, the garrison leader capitulated to Cherokee terms and agreed to walk his soldiers home, unarmed, to Charleston. Ostenaco's sense of vengeance, however, was not yet sated. He helped orchestrate an ambush of the garrison on its march. The Cherokees jumped from their positions in the forest and rained arrows down on the shocked party. Estimates vary but it is no accident that in the wash-up it was found that around twenty-two of the soldiers died—startlingly close to the number of Cherokees who Lyttelton had sacrificed.[25]

Through the land cessions of the 1760s and 1770s, Ostenaco was back by Attakullakulla's side, adding his name, dismally but he felt rightly, to the many treaties that gave away Cherokee grounds in exchange for goods and peace. Ostenaco always made decisions according to how he judged historical circumstances at hand.

On the Henderson purchase of 1775, however, his position appeared murky. In a highly unusual move, Ostenaco failed to turn up to the negotiation at all. One colonial observer noted that at this extraordinary meeting, with five hundred Cherokee male leaders, there was "only one principal man left behind." This was Ostenaco. Possibly he was just unwell or otherwise indisposed, and the observer did note that Ostenaco "sent word that what the chiefs agreed to he would abide by."[26] But his absence provides food for thought, especially in light of what happened next.

In the momentous aftermath of Dragging Canoe's 1776 campaign against revolutionary settlers, Ostenaco looked to carve out, at length, a third way of coping with incursion. His name appears on the first of the surrenders, the Treaty of Dewitt's Corner in May 1777. But it is missing from the second surrender at Long Island in July 1777. Ostenaco was certainly expected at the summer meeting that would conclude this second treaty. When revolutionary officials from North Carolina and Virginia turned up to the Holston River they found all the usual Cherokee leaders there bar one. They mentioned that "they were very sorry that [Ostenaco is] not come to the Treaty as we expected." The officials waited ten more days for this influential delegate. Eventually they decided to press on with the signing, since "there are warriors here to represent all your towns [who are] fully authorised . . . to confirm the peace."[27]

Ostenaco's absence from Long Island signaled that he was importantly present elsewhere—namely, among the Ani-Yunwiya at Chickamauga Creek. In between May and July, he had decided to abandon his elder peers and join Dragging Canoe in his efforts to preserve Cherokee culture elsewhere. He was probably the oldest among all the rebels. Critically, however, his move did not signal that he had gone completely over to Dragging Canoe's methods of resistance. Ostenaco lived among the Ani-Yunwiya but did not join their periodic raids on revolutionary settlers. At the same time, his nonviolence did not mean that he was trying to make peace via diplomacy. Ostenaco after 1777 chose to step away altogether from the Europeans' endless lures to engage. This stance confused to no end the whites who knew him. The revolutionaries who saw him as a fierce warrior could not understand his unwillingness to fight (and thus to give them a reason to enact vengeance). The loyalists who remembered him as an accomplished negotiator were befuddled by his reluctance to make new deals (which they might again manipulate in their favour). In his refusal during old age either to attack or to wrangle, Ostenaco sidestepped all the Europeans' ready labels for people like him (ignoble savage, dying Native). His suggestion to them that they were not, after all, the center of his story was the most destabilizing attitude they had ever encountered. It was a behavior so far from the expected that it failed to make headlines in colonial records at all, and consequently became obscured in later histories.

Ostenaco died some time in 1780, surrounded by loving younger Cherokees who respected how he had helped them rebuild their society even while he refused to fight their battles. His peer Attakullakulla died

around the same time, back in the old Cherokee mountains, no doubt unreconciled to Ostenaco but perhaps understanding of the choices he had made.

Attakullakulla, Dragging Canoe, and Ostenaco shared the experience of living through the Age of Revolutions as Cherokee men. Their varied approaches illuminate something of the creative ways that Indigenous people did so when the odds were significantly stacked against them.

Notes

1. Much of the research for this essay comes from my book, Kate Fullagar *The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist: Three Lives in an Age of Empire* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020).
2. On Attakullakulla, see Daniel Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists, and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756–1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 15–16. On women, see Theda Perdue, *Cherokee Women* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 42–43.
3. Robert Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, August 2, 1754, in *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, 1751–1758,* ed. R. A. Brock (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 1:267. And see also John Brown, *Old Frontiers: The Story of the Cherokee Indians* (Kingsport, TN: Southern, 1938), 56.
4. Transcript of July Meeting, 1753, in *Documents Relating to Indian Affairs,* ed. W. M. McDowell (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1992), 1:433–34. Note that Attakullakulla had in fact already been to see the British king; the South Carolina colony had helped arrange this back in 1730; see Kate Fullagar, *The Savage Visit: New World People and the Imperial Popular Culture in Britain, 1710–1795* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), chap. 3.
5. Washington cited in Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis,* 45. See also Paul Kelton, "The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North America," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 3rd series, 69, no. 4 (2012): 763–92.
6. William Richardson, Diary (1758–59), Parson John Living History Inc., http://parsonjohn.org/images/Richardson.pdf.
7. Alexander Miln to William Lyttelton, February 24, 1760, in McDowell, ed., *Documents Relating to Indian Affairs,* 2:498–500. See also my extended account in Fullagar, *The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist,* 34–38.
8. See Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis,* 138.
9. Attakullakulla cited in "A General Meeting of the Principal Chiefs and Warriors of the Cherokee Nation," Lochaber, October 18, 1770, Colonial

Office (hereafter CO) 5/72, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (hereafter NA, UK).

10. See cessions accounts in John Stuart to Lord Hillsborough, June 12, 1772, CO 5/73; Stuart Letters, June 16–August 24, 1773, CO 5/74; Lord Dartmouth to Charles Wright, June 10, 1773, CO 5/662, NA, UK.
11. See *Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* ed. W. M. P. Palmer (Richmond, VA: Walker, 1875), 1:283, 284–85, 291. For a neat account, see also Claudio Saunt, *West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776* (New York: Norton, 2014), 17–23.
12. Henry Stuart to John Stuart, August 25, 1776, CO 5/77, NA, UK.
13. See Fullagar, *The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist,* 124–25.
14. *Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* 1:283, 291.
15. Henry Stuart to John Stuart, August 25, 1776, CO 5/77, NA, UK.
16. Henry Stuart to John Stuart, August 25, 1776, CO 5/77, NA, UK.
17. Cited in Jim Piecuch, *Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775–1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 71–72.
18. There is little focused discussion of this group, but see Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among the Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 166–76, and Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 47–57.
19. Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 166–76; Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance,* 47–57. And see Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Path: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Revolutionary Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 225.
20. Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance,* 55, 160.
21. Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), chap. 4.
22. For these two battles, see Fullagar, *The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist,* 33–34.
23. Robert Dinwiddie to Richard Pearis, December 15, 1755; George Washington to Dinwiddie, January 1756, in Brock, ed., *Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie,* 2:296–97, 315–16, 322.
24. *South Carolina Gazette* (Charleston), June 21, 1760.
25. See Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee,* 123, and Fullagar, *The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist,* 36–38.
26. *Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* 1:291.
27. See a transcript in Alexander Henderson, "The Treaty of Long Island of Holston, July 1777," *North Carolina Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (1931): 74.

in literature, history, political thought, and digital humanities. He is the author or editor of eleven books, including most recently *The Revolution to Come: A History of an Idea from Thucydides to Lenin.*

Cindy Ermus is the Charles and Linda Wilson Professor in the History of Medicine, and Director of the Humanities in Medicine program at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. She is also an elected Fellow of the Royal Historical Society (FRHistS). She specializes in the history of medicine and the environment, especially epidemics and other disasters, in eighteenth-century France and the Atlantic world. She is the author of *The Great Plague Scare of 1720: Disaster and Diplomacy in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* and *Urban Disasters.*

Bronwen Everill is the former Director of the Centre of African Studies at the University of Cambridge. She now teaches in the Princeton Writing Program and is a Research Affiliate of the Laboratory for the Economics of Africa's Past at Stellenbosch University as well as a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Her most recent books are *Africonomics: A History of Western Ignorance* and *Not Made by Slaves: Ethical Capitalism in the Age of Abolition.* Her research on Africa in the Age of Revolutions is forthcoming with Princeton University Press.

Gideon Fujiwara is Associate Professor of History and Asian Studies Coordinator at the University of Lethbridge. His research looks at early modern to modern Japan, focusing on intellectual networks, *kokugaku* (Japan studies), community, nation and nationalism, and information access. He is the author of *From Country to Nation: Ethnographic Studies, Kokugaku, and Spirits in Nineteenth-Century Japan.*

Kate Fullagar is Professor of History at the Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, Australian Catholic University, and Vice President of the Australian Historical Association. She specializes in the history of the eighteenth-century world, particularly the British Empire and the many Indigenous societies it encountered. She is the author of *Bennelong and Phillip: A History Unravelled; The Warrior, the Voyager, and the Artist: Three Lives in an Age of Empire;* and *The Savage Visit;* editor of *The Atlantic World in the Antipodes: Effects and Transformations since the Eighteenth Century;* and coeditor with Michael A. McDonnell of *Facing Empire: Indigenous Experiences in a Revolutionary Age.*